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MOTIVATIONAL STRUCTURES UNDERLYING JUDICIAL DISCRETION:
AN INFORMATION THEORETIC INVESTIGATION
ABSTRACT
Judicial discretion has rightly been termed a puzzle. Given the several competing concerns
that can influence judges when they sanction offenders and the institutional structures that
typically constrain their decisions, the task of uncovering the motivational structures un-
derlying judicial discretion has proven very challenging for scholars. This paper develops a
behavioral model of federal judges exercising discretion pursuant to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and derives testable implications regarding the amount of prison term they im-
pose on convicted offenders. An information theoretic approach is used to investigate these
assertions. The data reveal a host of information about judicial discretion including how
various factors affect sanctioning decisions, how variation in case and offender attributes
heighten or reduce judicial concerns, how judges juggle various competing concerns while
exercising discretion, and how compliance with the guidelines competes with other judicial
concerns.
Keywords: Judicial discretion, utility maximization, information theory, limited dis-
cretionary regimes.
JEL Classification: K4, C5
1. INTRODUCTION
Decisions made by humans are often bounded, limited, guided, or constrained by institu-
tional structures within which they exercise discretion. For example, detailed rules usually
govern hiring and firing practices as well as wage and promotion decisions in most or-
ganizations. The discretion of any single actor in pronouncing decisions regarding these
outcomes is typically curtailed by such rules. Although the level, degree, and rigidity of
these constraints may vary from one setting to another the label “Limited Discretionary
Regime” may accurately describe most public institutions or governmental organizations.
Besides constraining discretion directly, such institutional structures can also have indi-
rect effects on the exercise of discretion. They may compel individual actors to substitute
their paramount concerns for subsidiary ones. For example, applicant qualification may
find itself relegated to lower importance if an organization is attempting to satisfy quotas.
Thus, decisions made within such regimes could have very complex mechanisms under-
lying them. This makes the task of empirically investigating their motivational structures
extremely difficult.
Decisions made by actors at various stages within the criminal justice system are
a good example of outcomes that are generated within a Limited Discretionary Regime
(henceforth LDR) and where several concerns or institutional structures may influence ac-
tors. Since decisions made by these actors directly impact the lives and liberties of indi-
viduals (suspects, defendants or offenders) as well as the general welfare of society (by
upholding its values or squandering resources), investigating, understanding, questioning,
and scrutinizing their determinants has always interested scholars in the social science and
legal communities.
Using empirical inquiry to aid in this endeavor, scholars take one of two approaches.
They sometimes rely on a direct approach (like conducting surveys) that aims to ascer-
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tain directly from actors their decision-making criteria. Unfortunately, when determinants
are theorized to involve controversial factors like race, ethnicity or gender, such direct ap-
proaches can be sub-optimal. Researchers must attempt to trick the actors into providing
the sought information without overtly asking for it. This is still a direct approach, albeit of
a different form, that generally entails considerable costs and is often difficult to implement.
More often they rely on an inverse approach whereby observed outcomes from real-
world processes are modeled, and their determinants inferred from these models. Observed
outcomes are said to reveal the motivational structures generating them. Despite its pop-
ularity among social scientists, existing strategies for using this approach are ill-suited for
understanding decisions made within the criminal justice system because (i) multiple, pos-
sibly competing, concerns may motivate actors, and (ii) institutional structures may not
allow actors unfettered discretion.
This paper utilizes an information theoretic variant of the inverse approach to inves-
tigate motivations underlying federal judges’ sanctioning decisions. Testable implications
of a utility maximizing judge—one who is attempting to balance several (possibly com-
peting) concerns while imposing an appropriate prison sanction—are first derived. The
paper considers judicial concerns relating to desert, deterrence, incapacitation, uncertainty,
consistency, and guideline compliance. The empirical framework is designed to overcome
the two main drawbacks of existing strategies noted above: an inability to take into ac-
count limits to discretion that federal judges (sanctioning pursuant to the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines) typically face; and an inability to isolate, identify, and estimate implications
stemming from the various concerns that potentially influence judges.
The analysis offers clearer insights into the links between various judicial concerns
and observable outcomes such as whether an offender is sentenced to some prison, the
amount of the prison term, and whether judges depart from guideline prescriptions. Re-
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tributive and utilitarian concerns were found to motivate judges to be harsher when sanc-
tioning offenders, while uncertainty and temporal consistency concerns had the opposite ef-
fect. The analysis also provides insights into how judicial concerns are conditioned by case
and offender attributes. Increases in severity of the offense and offenders’ criminal history
were found to heighten retributive, utilitarian, and guideline compliance concerns while
reducing uncertainty and temporal consistency concerns. Similarly, when defendants pled
guilty, they reduced judges’ desert, deterrence, incapacitation, and guideline compliance
concerns. The analysis also suggested that desert, deterrence, and incapacitation concerns
are substitutes for one another—when one rises the others fall. Importantly, the sentencing
guidelines were found to interfere with sound judicial decision-making: heightened guide-
line compliance concerns diminished more desirable (in a normative sense) motivations
such as just desert, deterrence, and incapacitation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the relevant
sentencing literature and provides an overview of the highly structured regime within which
federal trial court judges exercised discretion under the mandatory FSG. Section 3 develops
a behavioral model of a utility maximizing judge imposing sanctions conditional on case
and offender attributes. Section 4 explains how the information theoretic approach is used
for testing implications derived from this behavioral model. Section 5 presents findings
from applying the framework to Fiscal Year 2003 sentencing data from the United States
Sentencing Commission. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of findings and
their implications.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1. The Existing Literature
Scholars from a variety of disciplines including sociology, criminology, political science,
law, psychology, and economics have attempted to study and explain judicial behavior. To
analyze the determinants of judge’s decisions, scholars rely heavily on regression analysis,
usually by deriving and estimating reduced-form equations. There exists, for example, a
voluminous empirical literature assessing the influence of extra-legal factors on sentenc-
ing outcomes generated under some form of sentencing guidelines and, more specifically,
under the FSG. These include studies measuring the influence of a defendant’s personal
characteristics such as race/ethnicity (Steffensmeier and DeMuth 2000, 2001; Bushway
and Piehl 2002; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Albonetti 1997; McDonald and Carlson 1993),
or gender (Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001); the judge’s identity (Hofer, Blackwell, and
Ruback 1999; Anderson, Kling, and Stith 1999; Payne 1997) or, more specifically, the
judge’s race (Steffensmeier and Britt 2001); as well as the sentencing jurisdiction (Ulmer,
Kramer, and Johnson 2001; Johnson 2005, 2006) on outcomes such as departures from
guidelines (Kempf-Leonard and Sample 2001; Adams 1998); the extent of such departures
(Maxfield and Kramer 1998); alternatives to incarceration (Engen et al. 2003); imprison-
ment decisions (most studies), and the amount of prison term imposed (most studies).
The methodological limitations of this literature are well documented (Wooldredge
1998; Spohn 2000; Mears 1998). Partly in response to those criticisms, recently, the need
to control for the effects of decisions made by actors prior to the sentencing judge has
been recognized by researchers. For example, models involving a ‘presumptive sentence’
have been proposed and estimated (Engen and Gainey 2000; Ulmer 2000; Mustard 2001).
That is, given case characteristics, knowledge of the sentencing regime may be used to
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construct a presumptive sentence for use as an additional predictor in the model. This way
inferences about the remaining predictors are not contaminated by the decision of actors
prior to the judge. Their effects are said to have been ‘statistically’ controlled. And if one
imposes parametric constraints (typically of unity) on this measure, then one is modeling
the judge’s discretion to deviate from this measure (Griswald 1987; Bushway and Piehl
2002).
Similarly, censored sample models are now routinely employed to account for the
partial recording of sentencing outcomes (for example, a probation term recorded as a
prison term of 0 months). Furthermore, the choice between treating the censoring process
and the outcome generation process as being the same or different is itself debated in the
literature. Some researchers (Peterson and Hagan 1984; Steffensmeier and DeMuth 2000,
2001) argue that these decisions are distinct and should hence be modeled sequentially
using Heckman’s (1979) two step method to correct for sample selection bias in the prison
term model. Others (Rhodes 1991; Albonetti 1997; Bushway and Piehl 2002) have argued
that decisions made by sentencing judges can be modeled more appropriately within a Tobit
framework that assumes one underlying latent process generating both outcomes (Tobin
1958).
These modeling advances, although improving substantially on bivariate or multivari-
ate regression analysis, are still inadequate for studying the motivational structures under-
lying sentencing decision for two reasons. First, they do not permit scholars to isolate,
identify, and investigate various concerns motivating judicial decisions. Scholars typically
rely on sentencing theories to motivate their investigations or to justify their findings. How-
ever, the estimated reduced-form model may be consistent with more than one theoretical
claim. For example, when scholars uncover that judges, on average, sanction males more
harshly than females or minorities more harshly then non-minorities (by findings statisti-
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cally significant coefficients in reduced-form regression equations), what can one conclude
from this finding regarding why judges may be doing so? Is it because judges feel minori-
ties deserve harsher punishment or is it because they believe imprisoning non-minorities
will result in fewer averted crimes? Unfortunately, existing empirical investigations pro-
vide very limited insights into these nuances.
Second, these advances do nothing to control for the limited realm of sentencing pos-
sibilities contemplated by the judge. The realities of LDRs, such as those described next,
are typically not reflected in these models. For example, typically used models do not con-
strain the model predictions to lie within legitimate bounds. If a model of judicial discretion
is permitted to predict sanctions above or below the limits that the regime may place on the
sentencing judge, then clearly this model does not adequately reflect the reality it purports
to characterize.
2.2. Limits on Judicial Discretion under the Mandatory FSG
Limits on judicial discretion are ubiquitous. Over the last three decades the sentencing
environment in the United States has transitioned from a primarily unstructured system to
one in which sentencing in most jurisdictions is governed by some form of structure (Tonry,
1999). In contrast to just 30 years ago, today judges do not have the wide discretion they
had then in deciding the type and amount of sanction to impose (Tonry, 1996). Although
these regimes vary considerably from one jurisdiction to another, the system designed to
curtail the discretion of federal judges—the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (henceforth
FSG)—was, undoubtedly, the most comprehensive and most rigid of existing sentencing
systems (Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 1999; Cabranes and Stith, 1998).
The FSG were promulgated to structure sentencing in federal courts. They have
evolved considerably since their implementation in 1987, and will continue to do so. In
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United States v. Booker (543 U.S. 220 [2005]), for example, the Supreme Court effec-
tively rendered the FSG advisory. Before that, the discretion that judges exercised pursuant
to the FSG was very structured. Very little discretion resided with the judge in deciding
what factors were to be considered relevant. Their role was initially limited to a mechani-
cal “minimal-pair” (present/absent) determination of each of the factors that the guidelines
deemed relevant (Cabranes and Stith, 1998). In most circumstances, the guidelines also de-
termined the precise quantitative relevance of each of the factors. This computation yielded
offense severity and criminal history scores which determined where in a two-dimensional
sentencing grid the specific case/defendant fell. This cell then prescribed a sentencing
range, bounded by a lower and upper limit (FSG Manual, 2005). Until the recent Booker
ruling, with few exceptions, sentencing judges were expected to exercise discretion only
within these guideline-prescribed bounds or those resulting from statutory limits. The FSG
did, to be sure, list some exceptions when statutory limits could be ignored. For example,
effective 1994, for certain drug conspiracy cases, under §5C1.2, judges could impose a sen-
tence without regard to any statutory minimum sentence if the defendant satisfied certain
criteria (referred to as the Safety Valve provision). However, these criteria were fairly rigid,
related to facts, and were open to little interpretation (FSG Manual, 2005).
To offer defendants an incentive to provide “substantial assistance” (SA) to the gov-
ernment in the prosecution of another case or a co-defendant, the FSG did allow judges
to sentence below prescribed limits (U.S.S.G. §5K1.1). This type of a departure would be
considered exogenous (out of judicial control) as the motion for a SA departure could only
be filed by the prosecution on behalf of the government. Although technically judges had
the authority to deny a SA motion, a “vast majority of motions were [are] granted as a
matter of course” (Maxfield and Kramer, 1998, 5 n. 11). Hence, researchers also referred
to them as prosecutor controlled departures (Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 2000, 722). With-
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out such motions, judges could not depart from the guidelines, with one notable exception.
Under 18 U.S.C. §3553(b), judges could depart from the guidelines if they determined that
there were relevant factors not included in the guideline computations which, if included,
would have resulted in the defendant being sentenced outside the currently prescribed range
(U.S.S.G. §5K2.0). Such departures would be considered endogenous, or judicial, because
their need was determined by the sentencing judge. However, even if the sentencing judge
endogenously departed from guideline prescriptions the imposed sentence still needed to
be within statutory limits, if such limits were applicable.
Having decided on a sentence, the judge was then required to decide on the proportion
of that sanction that could be substituted by alternatives to incarceration (for example com-
munity confinement or home detention). Given case characteristics, however, formal rules
in the FSG constrained the types and amount of the substitutions judges could consider
(FSG Manual, 2005).
Finally, the choice of whether or not to imprison an offender was conditional on that
option being available. The computed offense severity and criminal history scores restrict
the options available to sentencing judges. These options were largely determined by the
“Zones” of the sentencing grid (A, B, C or D) from where the sentence is derived. For
example, when sentencing in Zones C or D of the sentencing grid, unless the judge departed
from the guidelines, some prison term was mandated.
As should be evident, the judicial discretion regarding incarceration that, until re-
cently, did exist in the federal sentencing system was both limited and possibly distributed
over several decision points. One would expected little room for judges in such a highly
structured regime to make choices, let alone rational ones. Yet, as pointed out by Posner
(2006, 412), “. . . judicial decisions, including those of federal judges, do not appear to be
random.” “So, . . . ” Posner goes on to ask “ . . . what is their motivational structure?”
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(emphasis added).
2.3. Current Focus
The aim of this paper is to advance empirical scholarship in this field by developing and
utilizing an information theoretic approach for investigating the motivational structures un-
derlying judicial discretion. In order to proceed empirically, the paper first derives testable
implications of theoretical claims regarding these motivational structures.
Judicial decision-making has rightly been termed a puzzle (Baum 2000). Given the
unique setting in which these decisions are made, it is hard to imagine other analogous
decision-making environments and, consequently, to borrow from existing scholarship in
other fields. Nonetheless, researchers studying the courts and judges usually rely on one of
two perspectives from which to approach judicial discretion—the economic or the psycho-
logical perspective. The economic perspective views the judge as a rational decision maker,
a rational actor in the limited sense of being purposeful and deliberative in her decisions
(Higgins and Rubin 1980; Posner 1993; Cohen 1991, 1992; Shavell 2004). This perspective
treats judges as making decisions like everyone else (Posner, 1995b). The psychological
perspective considers judges as individuals involved in a very specialized endeavor thereby
almost requiring a “psychology of judging” (Schauer 2007; Guthrie et al. 2001). This im-
plies, among other things, that judges think and decide unlike typical individuals. This is
partly due to their training as lawyers and partly because they are bestowed with the unique
duty of judging other individuals. A blend of the two approaches has been suggested by
many as the best means of getting clearer insights into the motivational structures underly-
ing judges’ decisions (Baum 2007). This paper follows that hybrid approach.
The economic approach to decision-making provides a theoretical as well as an an-
alytical framework for analyzing decisions made by actor in a variety of settings (Becker,
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1993). It is both a theory and a methodology. This paper, though relying only partially
on economic theories of decision making, relies heavily on the utility-maximizing method-
ology for deriving testable implications regarding the motivational structures underlying
judicial discretion. The behavioral model and its implications are derived next.
3. THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Consider a utility maximizing judge with multiple and possibly competing concerns. Each
of these concerns potentially influence the amount of sanction this judge imposes on a
particular convicted offender. Let the jth concern be denoted by S j and let the sanction
S be a function of these concerns (that is, let S = ν(S1, . . . ,SJ)). Assume that J inverse
function exist that allow us to write the concerns as a function of the sanction (S j = φ j(S)).
Then a judge’s utility function—dependant on these J inverse functions as well as a set of
case and offender specific attributes—may be denoted by
U =U(φ1(S), . . . ,φJ(S);X).
Accordingly, conditional on the attributes X , the judge sets the sanction at a level that
maximizes her utility. In order to derive testable implications from this generic problem,
there are two ways to proceed.
First, one can explicitly solve this problem for an optimum sanction amount. This
approach would be set up, for example, as the following constrained optimization problem:
max
S
U(φ1(S), . . . ,φJ(S);X) s.t. S ∈ (l,u)
where l and u are the statutory minimum and maximum sanction the judge is restricted to
sanction within. If we can make some assumptions about the shape of the judicial utility
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function and these assumptions admit a unique solution, then, presumably, we can solve
∂U
∂S = 0 and obtain a link between the optimum sanction, the attributes, and statutory lim-
its. Let this optimum solution be denoted by S∗ = g(X , l,u). Here g(·) can be a highly
non-linear function of all the behavioral quantities of interest (such as ∂U∂φ1 , . . . ,
∂U
∂φJ
and
∂φ1
∂S , . . . ,
∂φJ
∂S ) in addition to the attributes (X) and the statutory limits (l,u). Unfortunately,
this approach would require us to specify the shape of the utility function completely.
Alternately, we could use the implicit function theorem to solve for each of the func-
tions individually and derive a system of equations in the various φ j. A sufficient condition
for ∂U∂S = 0 is that each
∂U
∂φ j
= 0 hold individually. That is, we could solve ∂U∂φ j = 0 ∀ j ∈ J
individually to obtain a system of optimal solutions φ∗j (S) = g j(X , l,u) ∀ j ∈ J. Note that
the optimal solutions would be for each of the J inverse functions (concerns) and not the
sanction itself. Provided that the system is identified—none of the concerns are implied
by another or are redundant—the approach allows one to investigate each of the processes
individually.
Of course, the estimation of this system would not be trivial. Somehow, while esti-
mating this system, one would need to ensure that the underlying S is the same across all
these equations (in other words, φ∗j (S)≡ φ j(S∗) ∀ j ∈ J). More on that in Section 4. Before
that the paper turns to deriving precise definitions of the various competing concerns judges
may have when sanctioning offenders—namely, each of the inverse functions φ j that enter
the judicial utility function.
3.1. Components of the Judicial Utility Function
Broadly, this paper groups components of the judicial utility function under the headings of
concerns regarding just deserts, deterrence, incapacitation, uncertainty reduction, temporal
consistency, and guideline compliance. One may view the just desert concerns as being mo-
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tivated by retributive considerations whereas the deterrence and incapacitation concerns as
stemming from consequentialist considerations. That is, judges use the sentences they im-
pose as an instrument for accomplishing some other objective. On the other hand, one may
view the uncertainty reduction and temporal consistency concerns as psychological barriers
that capture cognitive limitations imposed by the real world due to uncertainty about the
future and judges’ desire to sanction consistently. Finally, guideline compliance concerns
may be viewed as the institutional pressures that judges are subject to. Note that judges
may not be required to sanction within guideline prescribed bounds. Rather, the barrier
is psychological and captures such diverse concerns as having one’s decisions appealed,
reviewed and/or reversed. Each of these is briefly discussed below and the corresponding
φ j components are derived.
3.1.1. Proportional Retribution or Just Desert
Extracting proportional retribution is, arguably, one of the central functions of a judiciary
in a democratic society (Von Hirsch 1976; Moore 1987). In order to not have the citizenry
extract retribution for crimes committed against persons or groups, an independent institu-
tion such as the judiciary punishes the criminal on behalf of the citizenry. With this goal
in mind, and given case and offender attributes, the judge must decide on an appropriate
prison term to impose.
Suppose there exists an external reference sanction that the sentencing judge believes
provides an objective amount of sanction deserved by this offender for this crime. For the
purpose of this reasoning, it is sufficient that judges perceive this reference sanction to be
objective. The sentencing guidelines provide precisely such a reference point. Guideline-
based computations yield an upper δ u and a lower bound δ l . Assume that the mid point
of the rage (δ ∗ = 0.5× δ l + 0.5× δ u) is an appropriate (just) reference sanction. This
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assumption may not be too outlandish. United States Sentencing Commission researchers
surveying Federal judges in a 2002 study (USSC 2003) found, for example, that more than
half the surveyed judges felt that the guidelines provided just punishment more often then
not (median of 4 on a scale from 1 to 6).
Clearly the computations cannot take into account all aspects of the crime, and were
never intended to. Judges, therefore, probably view this recommended sanction as an im-
perfect (noisy) quantification of proportional retribution. Consequently, if imposing sanc-
tions for extracting proportional retribution is a concern of the judge, she would like to
sanction as close as possible to this recommended sanction. Therefore, conditional on X , l,
and u, the first aspect of S that should come into U is the divergence between the sanction
and this objective amount, for example (S−δ ∗)2. Hence, let φ1(S) = (S−δ ∗)2.
3.1.2. General Deterrence
Another goal of sanctioning, one of several consequentialist and forward-looking goals,
that can affect the amount of prison term imposed by a sanctioning judge is general deter-
rence. Under this goal, the judge is attempting to deter potential offender from committing
crimes by setting an example of this offender (Posner, 1995a).
For this goal to influence the judge, she must believe that potential offenders are rea-
soning criminals and that they make offending decisions by weighing the differential costs
and benefits of committing the crime (Becker, 1968). By setting this sanction, the judge
is attempting to send a signal to these potential offenders about the costs they are likely to
face if apprehended.
Given the heterogeneity in the pool of potential offenders, the judge has no way of
knowing exactly how may offenders she will deter (η). However, she can make some rea-
soned computations regarding the marginal contribution of each additional unit of sanction.
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Clearly, a sanction of 0 months will not deter any potential offender. Let each additional
unit of sanction after that increases the number of potential offenders deterred. However,
as the sanction amount increases, let its marginal deterrent effect diminish. Since the more
risk averse potential offenders will be deterred with relatively small sanctions, potential
offenders who are not yet deterred will require larger and larger sanctions to deter. These
features are easily captured in the following assumptions:
dη
dz
=
1
z
∀z > 0
which suggests that the number of potential offenders deterred by a total sanction of S years
can be computed as
η = 1(S > 0)
∫ S 1
z
dz = 1[S > 0] log(S)
Strictly speaking, dηdz should only be proportional to z
−1. Since, ultimately, a parameter
will be attached to each component, the constant of proportionality can be set to 1 without
loss of generality. Therefore, if general deterrence is a concern for the judge then this term
must enter her utility function. Let φ2(S) = 1[S > 0] log(S).
3.1.3. Offender Incapacitation
It has been argued that the surest way of preventing criminals from committing crime is
by putting them behind bars—incapacitating them (Zimring and Hawkins 1995). Whether
individuals to be incapacitated can be identified in advance of their crime commission is
a controversy that continues to be debated (Reuter and Bushway 2007). However, if a
judge takes into account concerns about incapacitating the offender, then some connection
between the sanction and perceived risk this offender poses to society when (s)he is free
must influence judicial discretion.
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Suppose the judge believes that this offender, if not incarcerated, will re-offend within
the next z years. In the judge’s mind, this implies an annual offending rate of z−1. Con-
sequently, the judge feels that the number of crimes averted by incarcerating this offender
between (her)his current age (A) and (her)his age at release (A+ εS) will be
∫ A+εS
A
1
z
dz =
∫ A+εS 1
z
dz−
∫ A 1
z
dz = log(A+ εS)− log(A),
where ε is the proportion of the prison term that an offender is required to serve (85% in
the federal system). If the judge takes offender incapacitation concerns into account, her
utility function must therefore include this term. Let φ3(S) = log(A+ εS)− log(A).
3.1.4. Uncertainty Reduction
The judge may have sufficient information or facts about the crime. However, the public
safety concerns noted above are necessarily about the future and, as such, full of uncertainty
(Tonry 1987). It is therefore reasonable to expect the judge to take uncertainty about the
future into account.
Suppose, as assumed before, the judge feels that the offender will, if not incarcerated,
re-offend within the next z years. What the judge is not sure about is exactly when this
event will happen. The probability that the event will happen in a small time interval
within the z years can also be computed as pi = z−1. Using the Shannon (1948) definition
of uncertainty, the expected uncertainty in the judge’s mind per interval of time can be
computed as −pi logpi = z−1 logz. Of course, for some uncertainty to exist in the judge’s
mind, z must be positive. Hence, over a period of S years, the total uncertainty in the judge’s
15
mind can be computed as
1[S > 0]
∫ S logz
z
dz = 1[S > 0]
1
2
log2(S)
where log2 S ≡ (logS)2. If uncertainty about the risk this offender poses to the public
is important to the judge, then this term must enter her utility function. Therefore, let
φ4(S) = 1[S > 0] log2(S).
3.1.5. Temporal Consistency
Consistency considerations (Ableson, 1968) can be instrumental in motivating judges if, as
is commonly perceived, the consistency of sanctioning is a ready indicator of quality and
fairness of sentencing. This component of the judicial utility function can be motivated in
terms of commitment to future sanction. The logic runs something like this. In addition
to imposing a sanction in the current case, the judge is aware that her decision is also
a commitment to sanction similar cases in the future with similar severity. The judge’s
thinking may evolve over time (or with age). However, for the duration of this sanction, in
all fairness to this offender, she would need to impose the same amount of sanction to all
similar cases.
To quantify this kind of reasoning, let’s assume that the judge feels (based on available
attributes) that she will see this kind of case again within the next z years. This is another
way of saying that the judge feels she will be required to sanction this kind of a case z−1
times a year. Hence, over the life of this sanction, she will have to impose sanctions on a
total of ∫ S 1
z
dz = log(S)
similar cases. If, in all fairness to the defendant currently before her, she is to impose a
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sanction of S years on each of those, then she is effectively “locking” herself into sanction-
ing S log(S) years to similar cases over the life of this sanction. If the judge is motivated by
such fairness concerns, then this “commitment” to future cases must be part of her utility
function. Therefore, let φ5(S) = S log(S).
3.1.6. Compliance with the Guidelines
Finally, all else being the same, a judge would like to comply with the sentencing guidelines
as much as possible. This may be quantified in a number of different ways. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, in particular, are designed to guide and restrict judicial discretion
by using a grid system. Hence, guideline compliance can be quantified by defining a binary
indicator that flags whether or not the sanction falls within the guideline prescribed bounds.
In other words, the federal judge complies with the guidelines if she does not sanction above
(below) the guideline prescribed upper (lower) bound (δ u and δ l respectively). Therefore,
let φ6(S) = 1[δ l ≤ S≤ δ u].
Each of the concerns identified above can increase or decrease the judge’s utility.
To ease exposition and later computations appropriate signs can be added to them as well.
Since judges are presumably more satisfied when they are deterring more offenders, obtain-
ing larger incapacitation effects, or are complying with the guidelines and are less satisfied
when they are further away from the objective proportional sanction, are more uncertain
about the likely future offending of the offender, or when they are locking themselves into
large future commitments, the latter three concerns may be defined as the negative of the
derived transformations. Table 1 summarizes the various inverse functions motivated in
this section to quantify the various judicial concerns (with appropriate signs).
*** Table 1 about here ***
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3.2. Model Implications
Testable implications regarding the above model can be derived quite easily in a semi-
parametric information-theoretic framework. Consider defining the unknown transforma-
tion (concerns) as expectations over appropriate ranges. That is, let
φ j(S) =
∫ u
l
φ j(v)p(v)dv ∀ j = 1, . . . ,J (1)
where p(v) is assumed to be a proper density quantifying the probability that the imposed
prison term will be exactly v months (p(v) = Pr(S ≡ v)). For this to be a proper density
one need only impose the additional requirement that
∫ u
l p(v)dv = 1. Note also that the
integration limits ensure that predictions will fall within statutory bounds and therefore
will be sensible.
Next, one can make assumptions about how various attributes X are theorized to af-
fect the concerns. These may include offender attributes and case characteristics as well
as knowledge of the context in which sanctions are imposed (as captured, for example,
by jurisdiction). To introduce these attributes into the model, one can use (1) to derive
moment conditions. To the extent that these attributes are truly part of the model, they
should independently covary with each of the functions φ j(S). Hence, from (1), we get the
implications
E(Xφ j(S)) = E
(
X
∫ u
l
φ j(v)p(v)dv
)
∀ j = 1, . . . ,J (2)
which suggests the basic identifying restriction of this modeling strategy: So long as the
functions φ j(S) are non-linear transformations of S, one is guaranteed that each of the
covariances E(Xφ j(S)) will solve a different piece of the puzzle. Note, there is no restric-
tions that the set of attributes X be different across the equations. The same set of X will
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in general produce different covariances with the φ j(S) as long as the φ j(S) are not lin-
early related. Note also that X may include non-linear transformations of the attributes, for
example X2, log(X), and the like.
Of course, these implications can only be tested empirically if the density p(v) can
be estimated. Moreover, since the population covariances E(Xφ j(S)) are not actually ob-
served, their observed sample analogs need to be used. The next section describes how the
density p(v) can be recovered from a sample of imposed sanctions. It also discusses how
model implications can be tested, how quantities such as the marginal effects of case and
offender attributes on the sanction amount can be computed, and how important implica-
tions regarding judicial preferences—such as the elasticity of substitution among compet-
ing concerns—can be identified and recovered.
4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
This section begins with a definition of the sample counterparts to the population equations
derived in (2) and then explain how the density may be estimated using a semi-parametric,
information theoretic approach. First, it should be noted that statutory bounds will not, in
general, be identical across sample cases for which sanctions are observed (see Figure 1
and the surrounding text below). Hence, in this section subscripts of n are introduce to
identify distinct sample observations. The sample analogs of the population equations
derived above can be written as
∑
n
xk jnφ j(yn) =∑
n
xk jn
∫ un
ln
φ j(v)pn(v)dv ∀k ∈ K j; j ∈ J (3)
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where yn is the observed sentence in a particular case. The adding up constraints can be
written as
1 =
∫ un
ln
pn(v)dv ∀n ∈ N (4)
Although the set of attributes are indexed by k ∈ K j and are φ j specific, this is not required.
The notation is used merely to derive sample analogs in full generality. Clearly, there are
an infinite number of densities that are consistent with conditions (3) and (4). How does
one proceed?
4.1. The Information Theoretic Approach
The sample analogs derived above can be thought of as constraints implied by our theo-
retical reasoning on the possible shapes the density p(v) can take. Hence, we need some
way to derive the density function in as conservative a way possible while ensuring that the
density is consistent with the evidence. Zellner and Highfield (1988) in an influential paper
showed how the Maximum Entropy formalism can be used very fruitfully for precisely this
purpose. In that original paper, the authors derived a general class of densities using a set
of arithmetic moments. Ryu (1993) and Wu (2003), among others, extended that work to a
general class of transformations not just arithmetic moments. In this paper, sample analogs
of the theoretical implications are exactly in that general form. Hence, the same strategy
can be used here.
The basic mechanism underlying all information theoretic approaches, building on the
works of Shannon (1948) and Jaynes (1957), is to maximize the uncertainty implied by the
density subject to all consistency and adding up constraints. See Golan, Judge, and Miller
(1996) for a wide array of models that can be defined and estimated using this strategy. The
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problem may be formulated mathematically as:
max
{pn(v)} ∑n
−
∫ un
ln
pn(v) log pn(v)dv (5)
subject to (3) and (4). Note that since the judge is bound by statutory limits, the researcher
has no uncertainty about the sanction being outside these bounds. As such, the entropy is
integrated only over the realm of possibility in each case.
This is a standard constrained optimization problem that can be solved by variational
methods. The information theoretic solution is
pn(v) =Ω−1n exp
(
−∑
j
φ j(v)∑
k
xk jnβk j
)
∀n ∈ N (6)
where βk j are the lagrange multipliers associated with each of the constraints (3) and Ωn
(called the partition function) is defined as
Ωn =
∫ un
ln
exp
(
−∑
j
φ j(v)∑
k
xk jnβk j
)
dv ∀n ∈ N. (7)
This final solution can also be used to derive a dual (unconstrained) optimization problem
in the unknown βk j (Golan, Judge, and Miller 1996) and can be solved quite easily.
4.2. Diagnostics and Inference
The dual unconstrained minimization problem falls under a general class of extremum
estimators, βˆ = argminβ G (β ,y,X). The consistency and asymptotic normality of these
estimators can be established under general regularity conditions (Mittelhammer, Judge,
and Miller 2000, 132–139).
Assuming that standard regularity conditions are met, one way to conduct hypothesis
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tests is to construct and use the Entropy Ratio Statistic (E ). Since the value of the objective
function measures the amount of uncertainty implied by the probabilities, we can assess
the uncertainty reducing contribution of each (or groups) of the constraints by compar-
ing the values of the objective function from restricted and unrestricted models. Like the
Likelihood Ratio statistic, the Entropy Ratio statistic has a limiting χ2 distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters with values fixed (Jaynes 1979,
67).In a similar manner, one can obtain an estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of
the Lagrange Multipliers by computing the negative inverted Hessian of the dual objective
function. This covariance matrix can then be used to assess the stability of each of the La-
grange Multipliers without needing to estimate restricted and unrestricted versions of the
models.
Note that in assessing the statistical significance of the Lagrange Multipliers β we
are assessing whether or not knowledge about a particular attribute is relevant to the pro-
cess under study. The lagrange multipliers measure the “shadow price” of the constraint.
Hence, if an offender’s race is not relevant to judges’ concerns regarding guideline compli-
ance, then the corresponding Lagrange Multiplier should be close to zero. In other words,
the particular constraint does not add any information about the process. Testing the sig-
nificance of βk j only help establish the relevance of an attribute. It says nothing, directly,
about the magnitude or direction of the impact of the attribute on particular concerns or
outcomes. For that, one needs to compute the marginal effects of the attribute on particular
outcomes or concerns.
Given estimates of the βk j that optimize the dual objective function, one can recover
the density p(v) using (6). Then, expectations about the jth concern can be computed
as φˆ j =
∫ u
l φ j(v)p(v)dv and expectations about the oth outcome can be recovered as ψˆo =∫ u
l ψo(v)p(v)dv.Examples of outcomes include the prison term, whether or not the offender
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receives some prison, or whether or not the judge sanctions below the guideline prescribed
minimum. The marginal effect of the kth attribute on the jth concern may now be recovered
as
∂ φˆ j
∂xk
=∑
i
ρˆ jiβˆki ∀k, j ∈ K,J (8)
where ρ ji is the covariance between the jth and ith concern, and is defined as
ρ ji =
∫ u
l
φ j(v)φi(v)p(v)dv−
∫ u
l
φ j(v)p(v)dv
∫ u
l
φi(v)p(v)dv ∀ j, i (9)
The variance of a concern may, therefore, be computed as ρii. In a similar manner, the
marginal effects of attribute k on outcome o may be computed as
∂ψˆo
∂xk
=∑
i
γˆoiβˆki ∀k,o ∈ K,O (10)
where γoi is the covariance between the oth outcome and ith concern, and is defined in a
manner analogous to (9). Note that (10) allows a convenient decomposition of the effect
of various attributes on the oth outcome that is attributable to, or stemming from, the ith
concern. This decomposition is particularly helpful in directly assessing theoretical claims
about how and why attributes affect certain outcome.
Can this strategy help identify important behavioral aspects of judicial discretion?
One important feature about the preference of judges is the amount of substitution among
the various concerns. To see how this aspect of judicial preference is identified, consider,
for the moment, that we are able to estimate the density p(v). The marginal rate of sub-
stitution (MRS) between any two components of the judicial utility function, say φ j(S)
and φi(S) is derived by fully differentiating the utility function w.r.t. these components and
evaluating the equation at dU = 0. Let U j abbreviate ∂U∂φ j(S) . Then we can derive the MRS
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between component j and i, denoted τ ji below, as follows:
dU = 0 = U jdφ j +Uidφi
τ ji =U j/Ui = −dφi/dφ j (11)
It can be shown (see the appendix), based on (9), that the quantity on the right may be
computed as
τ ji =−
(
ρ ji
ρii
)
∀ j, i (12)
and the elasticity of substitution (denoted ε ji below) between j and i can also be computed
as
ε ji =−ρ jiρii ×
abs(φi)
abs(φ j)
∀ j, i, (13)
where abs(x) refers to the absolute value of x.
5. THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
This section describes the data and discusses the analysis results.
5.1. The Data
The data for this analysis were obtained from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Cen-
ter and is available to the public at http://fjsrc.urban.org. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
disseminates case processing records from a variety of federal criminal justice agencies
through a contract to the Urban Institute who maintains the FJSRC. The United States Sen-
tencing Commission provides its monitoring database to be archived at the FJSRC annually.
The present analysis used the criminal sentencing data for fiscal year 2003.
From the population of all cases sentenced during fiscal year 2003, cases where there
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were multiple counts were excluded from the analysis as were those cases with obvious
data errors. Since the programming for this analysis was done in the integrated matrix
language (IML) module of SAS which has limitations on the size of matrices that can be
inverted efficiently, a random sample of 25,000 observations was drawn from the final data
set for analysis purpose. The random sub-sample was compared to the original sample to
ensure that the two had similar average characteristics. They did.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the sample used in this analysis. The main
criterion variable, term of prison imposed, ranged from a maximum of 366 months to a
low of 0 months. The sample used includes offenders sentenced to some prison and those
sentenced to no prison. The mean prison term was 28.6 months (with a median of 18
months).
Sentencing guideline computations yield, based on the offenders criminal history
score and offense severity score, a guideline prescribed maximum and minimum sanction.
However, depending on the zone of the guideline grid, the judge may substitute some or
all the minimum sanction by a form of punishment other than incarceration. For example,
in zones A and B, the judge may substitute all of the sentence by non-incarcerative options
(like probation). Similarly, in zone C, the judge may substitute only half the sentence for
non-imprisonment, but in zone D the judge must impose the entire sentence as a prison
term. Hence, following these rules, the guideline prescribed minimum sanctions were first
converted into the effective minimum terms of imprisonment that the guidelines prescribe.
Based on applicable statutes, each case also has a statutory maximum or minimum
sanction that the judge must sentence within. Moreover, when mandatory minimum sanc-
tions are applicable, as is the case for some drug weapons related offenses, they can trump
(override) existing statutory or guideline prescribed bounds. Hence, using this information,
a set of statutory minimum and maximum bounds that judges must sanction within were
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created.
*** Table 2 about here ***
These bounds were adjusted further based on two additional factors. First, if the prose-
cutor sought a departure for “substantial assistance” then the judge may ignore all statutory
and guideline prescribed bounds. Hence, the statutory and mandatory minimum sanction in
these cases were set to 0. Effectively, if the prosecution sought a substantial assistance de-
parture then the judge could sanction the offender to 0 months. Similarly, under the safety
valve provision the judge could ignore the mandatory minimum sanction in certain drug
conspiracy cases. As such, the judge could sanction offenders to 0 months in prison if she
so desired. Taking all of these considerations into account, a pair of variables capturing the
statutory minimum and maximum prison terms—that bind the judges decision—as well as
a pair of guideline prescribed minimum and maximum prison terms—that guide the judge’s
decisions—were defined.
Table 2 provides descriptive on these variables as well. The statutory and guideline
prescribed minimum sanctions ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 180 and 360, respec-
tively, whereas the guideline prescribed and statutory maximum sanction ranged from a
low of 6 and 12 months, respectively, to a high of 480 months each. The mean months
of statutory minimum, guideline minimum, guideline maximum, and statutory maximum
were, respectively, 3, 32, 42, and 182.
Defendant age ranged from a low of 204 months (17 years) to a high of 1020 months
(85 years). The average defendant was 34 years old and half the defendants were younger
than 32 years. The offense severity score ranged from 1 to 43 with a mean and median of
about 15. The average defendant had 4 criminal history points (median of 2) with offenders
ranging from no criminal history points to one with 90.
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An overwhelming majority of offenders plead guilty (98%); 85% of them were males,
31% aliens, and 73% were white. A little less than half the offenders were Hispanics
(44%). Most of the cases sentenced in this sample were for drug related offenses (32%)
and immigration related offenses (25%). The remaining were for property related offenses
(21%), weapons related offenses (10%), public order offenses (7%) and for violent offenses
(3%). Though not displayed in the Table 2, the data had sufficient number of observations
per federal judicial circuit to afford an opportunity to assess the variation in concerns across
sentencing contexts as well. Unfortunately, attempts to model variation in concerns across
judicial districts increased model complexity considerably and convergence problems were
encountered.
*** Figure 1 about here ***
To graphically demonstrate the restrictive nature of the regime within which the ob-
served prison terms were generated, Figure 1 displays the regions within which judges are
required to sentence defendant as well as the region within which they are recommended
to sentence. The white area represents the guideline prescribed region that judges are ex-
pected to sanction within, unless they depart from the guidelines. The light grey region
below and above the thin white region are the areas where the judge may sentence if she
feels the need to depart. However, the dark gray regions are outside the bounds of what
judges can sanction–statutory bound. Hence, the upper and lower edges of the light gray
areas define the upper and lower bounds of integration in (3) and the upper and lower edges
of the white region define δ l and δ u, respectively.
5.2. Unconditional Models
The next two subsection discuss the main findings of the paper. A brief discussion of the
unconditional models (those without any covariates) is first presented as are the model’s
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implications. Findings from the conditional models are provided and discussed following
that.
Table 3 presents the lagrange multiplier estimates from the unconditional models.
Note that since the concerns are dimensionless, the actual size of the parameter as well as
its sign do not hold much meaning. In fact, scaling the inverse functions arbitrarily pro-
duces corresponding adjustments in each of the lagrange multipliers. Hence, what is more
meaningful is whether each of the constraints independently help reduce some uncertainty.
They do. In fact, all of the constraint have a lagrange multiplier that is significantly differ-
ent from 0. In this sample, each of the transformation of the prison term (quantifying the
various judicial concerns) are relevant in explaining some aspect of the distribution of the
imposed prison term.
*** Table 3 about here ***
More interesting than their statistical significance is the implication regarding how
they affect measured outcomes like prison term, the in/out decision, or the decision to sanc-
tion below the guideline prescribed minimum (a downward departure). Since the concerns
are dimensionless, these effects are computed and presented as elasticities in table 4.
*** Table 4 about here ***
The findings in Table 4 comport perfectly with expectations, both in terms of size and
direction. As one would expect, desert, deterrence and incapacitation concerns increase
the expected prison term and the probability of the defendant receiving some prison term
while reducing the probability of the defendant receiving a downward departure. Similarly,
concerns about uncertainty and temporal commitments decrease the prison term and the
probability of the defendant receiving some prison term but increase the chances that (s)he
will receive a downward departure.
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Interestingly, concerns about compliance with the guidelines (trying to stay within the
thin white region in Figure 1) results in larger prison terms and more chances of imprison-
ment but a lowered probability of a downward departure. These signs make perfect sense
when one recalls that the guidelines are criticized, among other things, for being too harsh.
Hence, when judges are trying to comply with the guidelines they end up sanctioning im-
prisonment more often, for longer periods of time, and with fewer downward departures
(compared to when they are less concerned about complying with the guidelines).
In terms of the magnitudes of the effects, the decision to imprison someone seems less
responsive (inelastic) to changes in the various concerns whereas there is some variation
among the prison term and downward departure outcomes. For example, the amount of
prison term imposed seems to be relatively inelastic to just desert, temporal consistency,
and guideline compliance concerns, yet fairly elastic (responsive) to general deterrence,
incapacitation and uncertainty concerns. Similarly, with the exception of desert concerns,
it seems the decision to depart downward is very responsive to all the concerns with the
highest elasticities stemming from general deterrence, incapacitation, and uncertainty con-
cerns.
5.3. Conditional Models
Unconditional models, though informative, mask a fair amount of heterogeneity among
cases and offenders. Next, results of the fully conditional models are presented. First,
Table 5 summarizes the signs and significance levels of the lagrange multipliers (see table’s
legend for notational definitions).
*** Table 5 about here ***
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As in the unconditional models, since these parameters reflect shadow prices of the
uncertainty reducing contribution of each of the constraints, not much should be read into
the signs of the parameters. However, it is interesting to note that most attributes—case,
offender and context based—are important in explaining the variation in some concern
or another. Moreover, some attributes are only weakly relevant. For example, the race
of the defendant (white verses non-white) seems not to be related with any of the major
concerns. It only helps explain some variation in guideline compliance concerns. On
the other hand, the ethnicity of the defendant (Hispanic versus non-Hispanic) seems to
be related to desert, deterrence and uncertainty concerns but not to incapacitation, temporal
commitment or guideline compliance concerns. These findings are contrary to the position
taken by scholars who argue that race is an important predictor of prison term because
of perceived or actual dangerousness—judges perceive non-whites and Hispanics as being
more dangerous. Apparently, race has little to do with the offender incapacitation concerns.
Hence, if judges do sanction Hispanics and non-whites for longer periods of time, it is not
because of the perceived threats these individuals pose to society. It is for other reasons.
In order to test the relevance of groups of attributes in the model, Entropy Ratio (E )
statistics were next computed to test a variety of nested models. Table 6 summarizes these
results. The first row of nested models are a comparison of the completely conditional mod-
els with models that remove all conditioning attributes from each of the concerns (given in
the columns) and finally from all concerns (the last column, titled ‘Combined’). As should
be expected, the variation among each of the concerns is individually explained by the at-
tributes included. There are 24 parameters estimated, per concern, in the conditional model
(including the intercept). Hence, the degree of freedom 23. In each of the cases the E
statistic rejects the nested model in favor of the full model.
*** Table 6 about here ***
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The next row of tests corresponds to nested models with all offender attributes re-
moved from the model. These include the dummy variables measuring whether the defen-
dant plead guilty, the gender of the defendant, whether the defendant is white or Hispanic,
and whether the defendant is an alien. With the exception of incapacitation concerns, all
other concerns seem to vary with offender attributes. Once again, this is a surprising finding
given that scholars highlighting racial, ethnic, or gender disparity in sentencing practices
usually put forth arguments that link judges’ sentencing decisions with the perceived dan-
gerousness of the offender. The implications of this argument is that it is incapacitation
concerns that are the cause of judges’ disproportionate sentencing decisions. The find-
ings presented in Table 6 do not support that claim. Put another way, despite the fact that
race, ethnicity and gender seem to be relevant to the sanctioning decision of judges, their
relevance cannot be statistically linked to incapacitation concerns.
The next row of models relate to the legally relevant factors (criminal history scores
and offense severity scores). The guidelines specifically state that judges may use these
factors in making sanctioning decision—over and above the computations in the grid sys-
tem. These attributes, as a group, are relevant to all concerns with the exception of temporal
consistency. Recall that temporal consistency relates to the concern that similar cases in
the future will need to be sanctioned similarly. Hence it is surprising, once again, to see an
attribute like offense severity not figure prominently in this concern. It is possible that this
concern varies by a more broad conceptualization of “case type”—for example, by offense
type. Lending some credibility to this possibility is the fact that, as Table 5 shows, the
offense type variables are all statistically significant for the temporal consistency concern.
Finally, the models tested in the last two rows of Table 6 relate to the offense type
variables and the circuit dummy variables. In all cases, the concerns are found to vary
significantly with these factors (as groups of variables).
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Although these findings and tests were related to the parameters of the models, they
are, in of themselves, less interesting than their implications regarding variation in con-
cerns. Implications of the conditional models, with respect to their marginal effects, are
discussed next.
*** Table 7 about here ***
Table 7 presents the effects of various factors in heightening or reducing specific con-
cerns. Once again, since these concerns are dimensionless, findings are presented in terms
of the percent change in the concern resulting from a unit change in the attribute. The find-
ings largely comport with expectations, both in terms of the directions and the magnitude
of effects.
Increases in the seriousness of the crime and the prior criminal activities of the of-
fender result in heightened desert, deterrence, and incapacitation concerns, while reducing
uncertainty and temporal consistency concerns. Surprisingly, though, they also heighten
guideline compliance concerns. A comparison across these effect suggests that unit in-
creases in offense seriousness and criminal history result in the largest increases in desert
concerns, relative to other concerns. This seems, at least on the face of it, a very predictable
finding. Since offense seriousness and criminal history are the least controversial of factors
considered by judges at sentencing, they are a good proxy for what an offender ‘deserves’
for the particular crime. However, higher offense severity and criminal history may also
require more fine-tuning of the sentence for a particular case/defendant. As such, this may
lead to heightened concerns about complying with the guidelines.
On the other hand, when defendants plead guilty, judges’ desert, deterrence, and inca-
pacitation concerns are largely reduced. Instead, the judge is more concerned about future
uncertainty of what the defendant may do and that the judge will need to impose simi-
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lar sanctions on similarly situated offenders in the future. Moreover, compliance with the
guidelines seem less of an issue to judges when defendant plead guilty.
Among males and aliens, compared to females and non-aliens, judges are more wor-
ried with desert, deterrence, incapacitation and guideline compliance and less worried
about future uncertainty and temporal consistency. The same is true for Hispanic defendant.
Variations of concerns across offense types are also very revealing. Property related
offenses is the reference category in these conditional models. Hence, all comparisons are
relative to that category. Just Desert concerns, for example, are heightened when judges
sentence cases for any offense type, compared to property offense, with the exception of
drug related offenses. Similarly, compared to property related offenses, all offense types
heighten judges’ deterrence and incapacitation concerns. As one would expect, compared
to property related offenses, judges are less concerned about future uncertainty, temporal
consistency, and, in some cases, compliance with the guidelines.
The findings for violent offenses are particularly revealing. The heightening of desert,
incapacitation and deterrence concerns are heightened by the largest amount (relative to
property offenses) when judges sanction an offender for a violent offense. In fact, compared
to property offenses, incapacitation concerns are about 13% higher for violent offenses,
but only about 4% higher for the remaining offenses. Similarly, judges’ uncertainty and
temporal consistency concerns are the lowest when sentencing offenders for violent crimes
than all other crimes.
The models also yield very interesting implications with regards to the variation in
concerns by circuit. The reference circuit is the 5th circuit (including LA, MS, and TX)
hence all comparisons are relative to that. Note that judges in most circuits have lower
desert, deterrence, and incapacitation concerns than judges in the 5th circuit, and have
higher uncertainty and consistency concerns than judges in the 5th circuit. Interestingly,
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among judges from all other circuits, judges from the 9th circuit (including CA, AZ, NV,
OR, ID, MT, WA, AL, HI, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands) seem to have the
lowest desert and guideline compliance concerns when sanctioning offenders. These find-
ings may reflect variations in sentencing philosophies across these jurisdictions. Similarly,
judges in the 2nd circuit (including CT, NY, and VT) seem to have the lowest deterrence
and incapacitation concerns (relative to judges from other circuits) when sanctioning of-
fenders. Although judges from most circuits seem to have lower guideline compliance
concerns than the 5th, this is not true for all. Judges from the District of Columbia circuit
seem to have heightened guideline compliance concerns relative to the 5th circuit judges.
The findings so far have discussed the effects of various attributes on concerns. It
would also be interesting to assess what these models imply for the traditional types of
outcomes. These include prison term, whether or not an individual gets some prison (com-
monly termed the in/out decision), and the decision to depart downward from the guideline
prescriptions. Table 8 presents findings regarding the expected percent change in particular
outcomes resulting from a unit change in the attributes.
*** Table 8 about here ***
The effects of attributes on these outcome largely reflect what is found elsewhere
in the literature. Both criminal history and offense severity increase the prison term by
roughly 5%; males and aliens receive prison terms about 12% and 14% higher than fe-
males and non-aliens (respectively); Hispanics receive prison terms about 6% higher than
non-Hispanics; and defendant who plead guilty avoid a “trial penalty” of nearly 12%. As
expected, violent offenders receive the longest prison terms, followed by offenders con-
victed of weapons related, immigration, drug related, public order, and finally property
related offenses. A similar pattern, with reversed signs is observed for the downward
departure decision. Surprisingly, however, the results suggest that none of the attributes
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contribute, in any meaningful way, in explaining the in/out decision. Effects on the in/out
outcome, owing to unit changes in the attributes, are all less than a percent.
Although the effects of attributes on various outcomes are interesting, in that they con-
form to expectation, one of the benefits of pursuing a structural approach to modeling the
decision-making process of federal judges was to be able to study the motivational sources
of these effects. In keeping with that aim, Table 9 presents a limited set decompositions of
the marginal effects of various attributes on the prison term. Here, the presentation reverts
to a marginal effects in level (in months) rather then percents so that the decompositions
are easier to understand.
*** Table 9 about here ***
Each unit increase in the offense severity score is associated with a 1.7 month increase
in the expected prison term. Note, however, that this marginal effect masks the source of
the increase. In fact, the prison term would be only 0.02 month had the judge only been
concerned about general deterrence. Had the judge only been motivated by incapacita-
tion concerns, the prison term would only have been about 0.6 months longer. On the
other hand, the desert concern, on its own, would have rendered a reduction in the prison
term similar to the temporal consistency concern, on its own. Therefore, the overall posi-
tive effect of increased offense severity really is an aggregation over more nuanced effects
stemming from a number of concerns.
The effects of pleading guilty is another case in point. The overall effect of pleading
guilty is a reduction in prison term of nearly half a year. This reduction is due, in large
part, to desert, deterrence, incapacitation, and temporal consistency concerns. However,
the reduction would have been higher had it not been for uncertainty concerns and about
guideline compliance concerns. Clearly, pleading guilty in a particular case demonstrates
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to a judge the defendants acknowledgement of his(her) wrong-doing. However, it is unclear
whether the judge perceives this as indicative of permanent remorse. Therefore, the judge
may still consider uncertainty about the future as a means of reducing the size of the ‘break’
being offered to this individual. In a similar manner, pleading guilty is, according to the
guidelines, not a grounds for reducing the sanction below the guideline prescribed bounds.
This is because ‘accepting responsibility’ for ones actions has already been built into the
guideline computations. Therefore, guideline compliance concerns seem to lower the ‘trial
penalty’ that would otherwise have been imposed on individuals going to trial.
Among the demographic factors, gender provides an interesting example. The overall
‘gender penalty’ (males get prison terms roughly 2.6 months longer than females) seems to
stem from incapacitation and uncertainty concerns. Judges imprison males longer than fe-
males for several reasons: They feel males deserve more punishment, that punishing males
will deter more potential criminals, will directly avert more crimes, and that the uncer-
tainty about the future requires that they be incarcerated longer. On the other hand, they
feel compelled to reduce males’ prison terms somewhat because of the need to sanction
similar offenders in the future and because of concerns about complying with the guide-
lines. The last of these, guideline compliance concerns, may be viewed as a penalty for
females rather than a break for males. Since the guidelines are gender neutral, when sanc-
tioning females, judges probably feel pressured to give them higher sanctions (than they
would have given their other concerns) based on a desire to comply with the guidelines.
A surprising finding emerges with regard to aliens. Judges would have liked to sanc-
tion aliens out of desert concerns for much longer terms than non-aliens. However, owing
to temporal consistency concerns, aliens get a break. This is a particularly strong finding
that needs further exploration and analysis.
36
5.4. Substitution Among Concerns
The last set of implications presented and discussed here relate to the substitution among
concerns. Table 10 shows the elasticities of substitution among the various concerns that
are relevant to judges decision-making process. This table offers several keen insights into
the motivational structures underlying judicial discretion. Once again, since the concerns
are dimensionless, all numbers presented in this table are elasticities. For example, the
number -4.01 in the first row under the GD heading implies that a judge is willing to give
up 4% of deterrence concerns for a 1% increase in desert concerns. Similarly, the number -
0.12 in the second row under JD implies that the judge is indifferent between a 1% increase
in deterrence concerns and a 0.12% decreases in desert concerns.
*** Table 10 about here ***
First, the models imply that desert, deterrence, and incapacitation concerns (one re-
tributive and the other utilitarian) are all substitutes for one another. Hence, these concerns
compete with one another when judges are making sentencing decision. When any one of
these concerns rises, in a particular case, it is at the expense of the other two.
Second, the psychologically motivated concerns—regarding uncertainty about the fu-
ture and temporal consistency—are also substitutes for one another. When either one of
them rises it is at the expense of the other.
Third, the psychological concerns are complements to the desert, deterrence, and in-
capacitation concerns. That is, when retributive or utilitarian concerns rise, they heighten
uncertainty and temporal consistency concerns.
Finally, guideline compliance concerns are substitutes for the retributive and utilitar-
ian concerns whereas they are complementary to the uncertainty and temporal consistency
concerns. If one considers the retributive and utilitarian motives as concerns that judges
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should, in a normative sense, take into account, then the analysis suggests that being con-
cerned about complying with the guidelines interferes with or competes with sound judicial
decision making.
The analysis also highlights the sensitivity of the substitution of one concern for an-
other. For example, judges concerns are most sensitive to changes in desert concerns. In
two-way comparisons, a 1% increase in just desert concerns needs to be more than offset
by other concerns for the judge to be indifferent. On the other hand, increases in most
concerns render a less than proportional adjustment in the guideline compliance concerns
(the last column in the table), with the exception of desert concerns. Taken together these
findings suggest that guideline compliance concerns are a constant, that do not fluctuate
much when most other concerns rise or fall. The exception being desert concerns. When
just desert concerns rise, they can even override guideline compliance concerns.
A similar analysis suggests that when guideline compliance concerns rise they offset
desert less than proportionally, but offset deterrence and incapacitation concerns dispro-
portionately. Similarly, when guideline compliance concerns rise they heighten uncertainty
and temporal consistency concerns, disproportionately.
These findings provide interesting insights into two recent episodes in the evolution
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The first is the pressure that the justice department
was perceived as putting on federal judges in 2003 when it was learned that the then Attor-
ney General (John Ashcroft) had instructed staff to compile lists of judges that frequently
departed from the guidelines (Weintraub and Kuehne, 2003). To the extent that this was
a means of heightening judges guideline compliance concerns it must have come at the
expense of desert, deterrence, and incapacitation concerns. Hence, when pressured in that
manner, judges are more likely to think about complying with the guidelines than about
sanctioning offenders based on their blame-worthiness, culpability, and the real or per-
38
ceived benefits that these sanctions can have for public safety in general.
The second relates to the recent Supreme Court rulings in the Booker and Fanfan
cases. These rulings have effectively rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory
and have therefore alleviated judges’ guideline compliance concerns almost entirely. It can,
therefore, be conjectured that judges, post-Booker and Fanfan, will be more concerned with
sentencing motives such as desert, deterrence, and incapacitation, and less about such com-
plying with the guidelines. Similarly, with a reduction in guideline compliance concerns,
judges now are able to craft sentencing more thoroughly (at least they may perceive this)
so that uncertainty about the future and temporal consistency may weigh relatively less on
their minds.
6. DISCUSSION
This paper has used an information theoretic framework to examine the motivational struc-
tures underlying judicial discretion. The behavioral model was derived using the analyt-
ical framework of the economic approach to behavior. Judges are assumed to maximize
their utility while sanctioning offenders to prison. With the assumptions that the observed
sanctions imposed by judges should reveal their underlying motivational structures, a set
of concerns that may influence judges while making their decisions were first derived.
These concerns—including desert, deterrence, incapacitation, uncertainty, consistency, and
guideline compliance—covered four categories of concerns that may motivate judges (re-
tributive, consequentialist, psychological, and institutional).
Next, implications of the ensuing models were derived and subjected to empirical
testing. A large number of interesting findings emerge from this analysis.
Unconditional models confirmed that each of the concerns were in fact part of the
decision making process of federal judges sentencing convicted offenders pursuant to the
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FSG during fiscal year 2003. More specifically, the retributive and utilitarian concerns
typically motivated judges to pronounce harsher prison terms while psychological concerns
(like uncertainty and consistency) reduced the harshness of the sanction. Concerns about
complying with guidelines typically resulted in harsher sanctions as well.
Conditional models were then estimated. These models provided further clarity into
the decision-making process of federal judges. Although judges’ concerns varied substan-
tially across case and offender attributes as well as the context, some concerns were less
responsive to variations in attributes than other. Increases in offense severity and crimi-
nal history typically heightened retributive, utilitarian, and guideline compliance concerns
while reducing uncertainty and consistency concerns. When defendant plead guilty, they
reduced judges’ desert, deterrence, incapacitation and guideline compliance concerns. The
same concerns were heightened when judges sanction males, alien or Hispanics. Desert,
deterrence, and incapacitation concerns were highest among violent offenders.
Although males were sentenced more harshly than females, the reasons for this dispar-
ity was traced to incapacitation and uncertainty concerns. Similarly, although a substantial
trial penalty was found, the analysis revealed that the lions share of that penalty comes from
incapacitation and temporal consistency concerns: guideline compliance concerns actually
reduce the amount of trial penalty received by defendants.
Typically, desert, deterrent, and incapacitation concerns were found to be substitutes
for one another as were concerns about uncertainty and temporal consistency. Heightened
concerns about desert, deterrence, and incapacitation were complemented by heightened
uncertainty and consistency concerns. Guideline compliance concerns seemed to interfere
(or compete) with sound judicial decision-making, if by sound decision-making we imply
that judges should use the traditional motivations—desert, deterrence, and incapacitation—
while sentencing defendants.
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The findings summarized above offer several implications for future research, prac-
tice, and policy. First, traditional linear reduced-form models offer little guidance as to
‘why’ judges do what they do. Hence, to understand the motivational structures underling
judicial discretion, a more structured approach is required. This paper has presented and
applied one such framework that seems to offer keen insights into several aspects of judicial
discretion.
Second, the types of concerns included in this analysis were limited to six. Schol-
ars interested in distinguishing more nuanced theoretical claims will need to derive their
implications explicitly in order to introduce them into the framework. For example, the
analysis presented in this paper did not include rehabilitation concerns largely because it
is difficult to reason how those concerns will manifest themselves in the amount of prison
term imposed. Similarly, scholars interested in distinguishing between general and specific
deterrence concerns (that is, deterring the same individual from future offending) may need
to derive more nuanced inverse functions.
Third, theoretical claims about controversial aspects of judicial discretion—such as
racial, ethnic, or gender disparities—are usually very specific. For example, the literature
on racial and ethnic disparity usually interprets the presence of a race or ethnicity ‘effect’
as confirmation of the theoretical claim that judges typically perceive minorities to be more
dangerous. This suggests that judges impose harsher sanctions on these groups due to
incapacitation concerns. The analysis presented in this paper refutes this line of reasoning.
Although these effects were found, they are present for reasons other than the theory that
is used to justify them.
Fourth, for policy and practice, the analysis presented in the paper suggests clear ev-
idence of the consequences of implicit (if not explicit) pressures on judges. Despite the
independence of the judiciary, institutional pressures stemming from one branch of gov-
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ernment may interfere with sound decision-making in another. Of course, there is informal
acceptance of this proposition. However, the analysis presented here provides evidence of
the amount of such interference.
Finally, entities such as Sentencing Commissions, that are tasked with designing in-
stitutional structures that limit, bound, guide, or otherwise constrain the discretion of actors
need to consider the larger implications of these structures prior to their implementation.
These structures should be fine-tuned so that the rigidity of the limited discretionary regime
does not interfere too much with sound decision making. An analytical framework, such
as that developed here, can be an effective tool in achieving that trade-off optimally.
APPENDIX: DERIVING THE MARGINAL RATE OF SUBSTITUTION
For an unconditional model, given the estimated density
p(v) =Ω−1 exp
(
−∑
j
φ j(v)β j
)
∀v ∈ (l,u),
where Ω is the partition function, one can compute the expected value of any of the func-
tions φ j as φ j =
∫ u
l φ j(v)p(v)dv ∀ j ∈ J. Since the only way this expectation can change is
through a change in the underlying Lagrange multipliers β j, one may pose the following
question: What change can be expected in φ j and φi with respect to a unit change in βi?
Note, the effects of a change in the ith Lagrange multiplier are being assessed on expecta-
tions about the jth as well as the ith concern. Given the functional forms above, it is easy
to see that
∂φ j
∂βi
= ρ ji and
∂φi
∂βi
= ρii
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so that, one can get
τ ji =−
(
∂φ j
∂βi
)/(∂φi
∂βi
)
=−∂φ j
∂φi
=−ρ j j′
ρ j j
This quantity is the marginal rate of substitution among concerns and the elasticity of
substitution may be obtained by appropriately scaling the quantity by a ratio of the absolute
values of each of the involved concerns.
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Table 1: Inverse functions linking sanctions to various concerns
entering the judicial utility function.
Inverse Function Judicial concern
φ1(S) =−(S−δ ∗)2 Just Deserts (JD)
φ2(S) = +1[S > 0] log(S) General Deterrence (GD)
φ3(S) = + log(A+ εS)− log(A) Offender Incapacitation (OI)
φ4(S) =−1[S > 0] log2(S) Uncertainty Reduction (UR)
φ5(S) =−S log(S) Temporal Consistency (TC)
φ6(S) = +1[δ l ≤ S≤ δ u] Guideline Compliance (GC)
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Table 2: Sample characteristics for convicted defendants sentenced by
federal judges pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Fiscal
Year 2003.
Variables Mean Median Min Max
Prison Term (mos) 28.6 18 0 366
Statutory Minimum (mos) 3.0 0 0 180
GL Prescribed Minimum (mos) 32.1 24 0 360
GL Prescribed Maximum (mos) 42.1 30 6 480
Statutory Maximum (mos) 182.7 120 12 480
Defendant Age (mos) 408.0 384 204 1020
Offense Severity Score (range 1-43) 15.6 15 1 43
Criminal History Points (range 0-90) 4.0 2 0 90
Defendant Plead (%) 98.3
Male Defendant (%) 85.5
Alien Defendant (%) 31.8
White Defendant (%) 73.3
Hispanic Defendant (%) 44.9
Immigration Related Offensea(%) 25.8
Violence Related Offensea(%) 3.3
Drug Related Offensea(%) 32.6
Public Order Related Offensea(%) 7.3
Weapons Related Offensea(%) 9.6
a Most serious offense
Sample size = 25,000.
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Table 3: Unconditional model lagrange multiplier point estimates, asymp-
totic standard errors, Wald tests, and p-values.
Concern Parameter a.s.e. Wald χ2 p-val
JD Just Desert 0.000742 0.000016 2142.0 0.00
GD General Deterrence -0.413706 0.009929 1736.1 0.00
OI Offender Incapacitation 4.689972 0.848149 30.6 0.00
UR Uncertainty Reduction 0.040148 0.008733 21.1 0.00
TC Temporal Consistency 0.014052 0.000375 1404.9 0.00
GC Guideline Compliance 3.029693 0.021056 20703.1 0.00
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Table 4: Median elasticity of outcome to concerns, unconditional models.
Concerns
Outcomes JD GD OI UR TC GC
Prison Term 0.132 1.215 1.014 -1.126 -0.831 0.376
Some Prison 0.006 0.042 0.022 -0.028 -0.013 0.008
Downward Departure -0.602 -2.885 -2.328 2.638 1.900 -1.448
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Table 5: Lagrange multiplier estimated signs and significance, condi-
tional models.
Variables JD GD OI UR TC GC
Offense Severity Score −− 0 ++ −− 0 ++
Criminal History Points −− ++ 0 −− 0 ++
Defendant Plead −− 0 0 0 ++ 0
Male Defendant ++ ++ + −− + −−
Alien Defendant ++ ++ 0 −− ++ ++
White Defendant 0 0 0 0 0 −−
Hispanic Defendant ++ + 0 −− 0 0
Immigration Related Offensea ++ 0 ++ −− ++ −−
Violence Related Offensea 0 0 ++ −− ++ −−
Drug Related Offensea ++ 0 ++ −− ++ −−
Public Order Related Offensea −− 0 ++ 0 ++ 0
Weapons Related Offensea 0 −− ++ −− ++ 0
Circuit00 −− −− 0 ++ 0 ++
Circuit01 0 −− + ++ ++ ++
Circuit02 −− −− + ++ 0 0
Circuit03 0 −− 0 ++ −− 0
Circuit04 0 −− 0 0 −− +
Circuit06 ++ −− 0 0 ++ −
Circuit07 0 −− −− 0 −− −−
Circuit08 0 −− 0 + 0 +
Circuit09 −− −− 0 0 0 −−
Circuit10 0 −− − 0 0 0
Circuit11 + −− 0 0 0 0
a Most Serious Offense
Legend: ++ = positive > 95%; + = positive > 90%; – – = negative > 95%; – =
negative > 90%; 0 = statistically insignificant with 90% confidence
All models include an intercept (not shown)
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Table 6: Entropy ratio statistics and relevant degrees of freedom for test-
ing the exclusion of groups of attributes, by judicial concerns.
JD GD OI UR TC GC Combined
Null Models
E 1158.7 703.6 317.0 2465.7 1196.7 1417.8 15558.0
df 23 23 23 23 23 23 138
Less Offender Attributes
E 114.4 103.3 7.4* 129.4 77.7 27.8 1286.7
df 5 5 5 5 5 5 30
Less Case Attributes
E 30.5 195.2 139.1 1394.6 1.4* 688.7 6582.5
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 12
Less Offense Dummy Variables
E 424.2 12.2 125.5 194.8 497.2 135.7 1458.3
df 5 5 5 5 5 5 30
Less Circuit Dummy Variables
E 136.9 103.2 31.9 55.4 48.2 411.3 1859.7
df 11 11 11 11 11 11 66
* Cannot be rejected with 95% confidence
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Table 7: Median percent change in judicial concerns for every unit change in
individual attributes.
Concerns
Attributes JD GD OI UR TC GC
Offense Severity Score 22.5 3.9 5.1 -5.1 -7.0 9.2
Criminal History Points 15.3 3.9 5.2 -4.8 -7.5 5.6
Defendant Plead -32.3 -9.5 -11.6 8.2 17.6 -13.4
Male Defendant 28.6 7.8 11.9 -10.4 -15.6 6.0
Alien Defendant 25.3 10.4 13.9 -12.9 -16.6 3.2
White Defendant -12.4 -1.2 -2.7 1.9 3.4 -7.0
Hispanic Defendant 14.0 4.6 6.0 -6.2 -8.4 3.6
Immigration Related Offensea 6.3 4.3 3.8 -5.1 -3.5 -2.8
Violence Related Offensea 9.0 8.0 13.6 -12.8 -17.8 -2.8
Drug Related Offensea -1.1 3.1 3.7 -4.6 -3.7 -3.8
Public Order Related Offensea 1.5 1.8 2.8 -3.3 -4.3 0.0
Weapons Related Offensea 3.8 1.6 4.3 -7.3 -6.7 0.0
Circuit00 -24.3 -11.9 -20.4 18.6 26.7 4.0
Circuit01 -21.0 -8.5 -12.6 10.8 15.7 0.1
Circuit02 -62.7 -16.5 -26.2 19.7 32.1 -18.7
Circuit03 -55.4 -16.0 -23.4 18.3 29.1 -17.7
Circuit04 -14.1 -6.2 -8.3 7.1 10.2 0.0
Circuit06 -39.5 -9.3 -14.1 9.5 17.8 -16.0
Circuit07 -15.8 -5.3 -7.1 3.8 8.7 -6.6
Circuit08 -28.8 -8.6 -13.1 10.3 16.1 -7.0
Circuit09 -74.2 -13.3 -16.0 11.9 23.3 -34.6
Circuit10 -36.3 -9.1 -13.9 9.9 17.8 -12.3
Circuit11 -15.1 -6.1 -8.6 6.8 10.6 -1.7
a Most serious offense
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Table 8: Median percent change in sentencing out-
comes for every unit change in individual attributes.
Outcomes
Variables PTb IOc DDd
Offense Severity Score 5.2 0.1 -25.8
Criminal History Points 5.2 0.1 -16.9
Defendant Plead -11.8 -0.1 38.4
Male Defendant 12.0 0.2 -24.6
Alien Defendant 14.0 0.3 -22.3
White Defendant -2.8 0.0 18.9
Hispanic Defendant 6.0 0.1 -14.6
Immigration Related Offensea 3.7 0.3 24.5
Violence Related Offensea 13.7 0.3 8.2
Drug Related Offensea 3.6 0.2 24.2
Public Order Related Offensea 2.8 0.1 -4.1
Weapons Related Offensea 4.3 0.2 -7.9
Circuit00 -20.6 -0.4 -11.6
Circuit01 -12.7 -0.3 11.6
Circuit02 -26.6 -0.4 60.1
Circuit03 -23.6 -0.4 60.9
Circuit04 -8.3 -0.2 8.8
Circuit06 -14.3 -0.2 46.7
Circuit07 -7.2 -0.1 24.3
Circuit08 -13.3 -0.2 26.4
Circuit09 -16.4 -0.2 95.2
Circuit10 -14.1 -0.2 37.7
Circuit11 -8.7 -0.2 12.9
a Most serious offense
b Prison term imposed
c In-out decision
d Downward departure
58
Table 9: Decomposition of the mean marginal effects of select attributes on the
months of prison term imposed by judges, stemming from various judicial con-
cerns.
Variables JD GD OI UR TC GC Alla
Offense Severity Score -0.09 0.02 0.59 0.97 -0.06 0.34 1.77
Criminal History Points -0.02 0.31 -0.09 0.87 0.02 0.08 1.17
Defendant Plead -0.79 -0.64 -2.62 1.13 -3.88 0.36 -6.44
Male Defendant 0.69 0.67 1.37 2.11 -1.36 -0.80 2.67
Alien Defendant 4.30 1.53 -1.15 3.67 -7.88 0.50 0.97
White Defendant 0.12 -0.01 0.70 -0.31 -0.89 -0.61 -1.00
Hispanic Defendant 0.67 0.34 -0.61 1.78 -1.26 0.04 0.96
a Sum across individual components (see (10) for derivation)
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Table 10: Median elasticity of substitution among
judicial concerns, conditional models.
JD GD OI UR TC GC
JD ... -4.01 -2.33 2.97 1.80 -2.59
GD -0.12 ... -0.58 0.62 0.44 -0.12
OI -0.18 -1.42 ... 1.12 0.78 -0.32
UR 0.12 1.30 0.85 ... -0.62 0.22
TC 0.20 1.69 1.27 -1.39 ... 0.40
GC -0.24 -1.70 -1.41 1.58 1.17 ...
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Figure 1: The Limited Discretionary Regime within which federal judges exercise discre-
tion
61
